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The Types of Evidence: An Analysis
Lyman Ray Patterson*
Professor Patterson presents here an analysis of direct and circum-
stantial evidence in functional terms, and compares the resulting mean-
ings with the traditional meanings of direct, circumstantial, real, and
demeanor evidence. In conclusion, he discusses the significance of this
analysis in relation to the rules of evidence and to proving in a trial.
I. INTRODUCTrION
Analysis is a process the purpose of which is to determine the rela-
tionship of the parts of a whole so as to ascertain their purpose, func-
tion, and nature. With respect to evidence the process is one of
determining the relationship of the parts which constitute the evidence
to the proposed conclusion. This is because evidence is a relative term;
evidence, in order to be evidence, must be related to a proposed
conclusion. Thus, the statement, "D purchased a pistol and ammuni-
tion" is ony a statement in the abstract. When, however, the statement
is related to the proposed conclusion, "D killed H." it becomes evi-
dence. Evidence, then, fulfills the definite function of aiding one in
determining the truth or falsity of a proposed conclusion. In order to
understand how evidence fulfills this function, it is necessary to ana-
lyze evidence in functional terms.
Since the purpose of this article is to analyze evidence in functional
terms, it may be helpful at the outset to state the basic ideas which
underlie the discussion.
1. Evidence consists of propositions of fact which are related to
another proposition, a proposed conclusion. Evidence is thus to
be distinguished from the fact or facts which are its basis.
2. The essential relationship of propositions which are evidence
to the proposition which is the proposed conclusion is relevancy.
3. The relevancy of evidence to the pioposed conclusion is
determined by the inference drawn from the evidence. If the
evidence will support an inference which coincides with the
Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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proposed conclusion it is relevant. Otherwise it is not.
4. There are two basic types of evidence, direct and circum-
stantial, which, for purposes of analysis, are best defined in func-
tional terms, by relating the propositions which are evidence to
the proposed conclusion.
5. Real evidence and demeanor evidence are facts presented to
the senses of the trier of fact and as such should not be thought
of as evidence, but only as exhibits which are bases of evidence.
6. Proving in a trial is a process which involves two basic
steps by the trier: a determination of the reliability of the evi-
dence, and the drawing of inferences therefrom. The first step
is the credibility step, requiring a credibility inference; the second
step is the probative step, requiring a probative inference.
7. Proof is the inference drawn from the evidence. Although
evidence is generally called proof, it is in fact only the basis of
proof.
To develop these ideas, this article first states the meaning of
evidence. It then analyzes direct and circumstantial evidence in
functional terms, and compares the resulting meanings with the
traditional meanings of direct, circumstantial, real, and demeanor
evidence. Finally, it discusses the significance of the analysis in rela-
tion to the rules of evidence and proving in a trial.
II. Tim MEANING OF EVIDENCE
Evidence is a term ordinarily used to indicate facts which produce
conviction in the mind as to the existence of another fact. Analytically,
however, evidence does not consist of facts, and it is only the basis for
that which produces conviction in the mind. To determine why this
is so it is necessary to define the term evidence more precisely. Such
a definition requires making a fundamental distinction between fact
and proposition of fact. A fact is simply something which exists. A
proposition is an expression in which the predicate affirms or denies
something of the subject. The subject stands for a fact and the
predicate expresses what one knows or purports to know about the
fact. Although it is often said that facts produce conviction in the
mind-meaning that evidence consists of facts-it is more helpful to say
that evidence consists of propositions of fact, because all facts must be
reduced to propositions before they are used to confirm or deny a
proposition. For example, if the conclusion that D killed H is based on
a pistol, a love letter, a hat, a key, and D's presence in the vicinity of
H's house before and after the killing, these items are merely facts,
and as such they are meaningless as evidence. However, they are
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the basis of evidence when transformed into propositions of fact. The
evidence then may be the propositions: (1) D owned the pistol.
(2) D wrote H's wife the love letter. (3) D's hat was found in H's
house. (4) D had a key to H's house. (5) D was in the vicinity of
H's house before and after the killing.' The facts are evidentiary facts,
and as such are the basis of evidentiary propositions, but they should
not be treated as the evidence itself.
Not all propositions, however, are evidence. First, "proposition" is
another name for a statement, and a proposition may be nonsensical.
Thus, the statement, "All men have two heads" is a proposition, but it
is not a proposition of fact. To be evidence, a proposition must be
based on a fact or supposed fact. Thus, the term proposition of fact
serves to eliminate nonsensical propositions as evidence. Second,
evidence is a relative term, and a proposition must be related to
something before it is evidence. This something is another proposition
called a proposed conclusion. The purpose of using evidence is
to confirm or deny the proposed conclusion, and this is done by
relating the evidence to the proposed conclusion. The relationship
between the proposition of evidence and the proposed conclusion
can be ascertained only by drawing inferences from the evidence,
which are simply conclusions one reaches as a result of the evi-
dence. Thus, the use of evidence requires the making of an infer-
ence from the evidence, which inference is necessary to relate the
evidence to the proposed conclusion. This inference is the probative
inference, and it is such inferences which cause one to confirm or
deny the proposed conclusion. Consequently, it is these inferences
which produce conviction in the mind as to the existence of a fact.
Just as facts are the basis of evidence, i.e., propositions of fact, evi-
dence is the basis of that which produces conviction in the mind, i.e.,
inferences. Thus, evidence can be defined as a proposition purportedly
based on a fact and used as a basis for confirming or denying another
proposition of fact.'
The distinction between facts as evidence and propositions as
evidence is sometimes obscured because the term fact is often used
to mean proposition of fact. Also, the term evidence is commonly
used to indicate facts which, as evidentiary facts, are the basis of
propositions of fact to distinguish them from other facts. The varied
usage of the term evidence is one of the reasons for the more precise
definition given above. Another reason is that a definition such as the
1. These examples, used throughout the article, are based on an illustration in
MORGAN, MAGaRE & WENSTMN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 326-37 (4th
ed. 1957).
2. For an expanded treatment of the meaning of evidence, see Patterson, Evidence:
A Functional Meaning, 18 VAND. L. 11Ev. 875 (1965).
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one suggested is necessary for a fundamental analysis of evidence and
evidentiary problems. Its primary value is that it reduces all evidence
to its lowest common denominator, something which is necessary if
evidence is to be properly analyzed. All evidence must be related
to a proposed conclusion, but it is impossible, for the purposes of
proving, to relate meaningfully a physical object such as a pistol to
a proposed conclusion. The only thing that can be related to the
proposed conclusion is a statement about the physical object, i.e., a
proposition.3
The relationship between propositions which are evidence and the
proposition which is the proposed conclusion is extremely important,
because it is this relationship which determines the types of evidence,
direct and circumstantial.
III. Tim FTNCTIONAL MEANING OF DIREcr AND
CmCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A. The Functional Meaning of Direct Evidence
Since the purpose of using evidence is to confirm or deny a proposed
conclusion, it is the conclusion to which evidence must be related
in order to define the types of evidence in functional terms. This
relationship is determined by the inference that can be properly
drawn from the evidentiary proposition. If the proposed conclusion is
"D killed H," and the witness testifies, "I saw D kill H," the trier,
assuming he accepts the proposition of the witness, can properly infer
only that D killed H. The evidence is direct evidence because it is
the basis of a direct inference which coincides with the proposed
conclusion, and the inference is the only inference relative to the
proposed conclusion that can be properly drawn. Thus, the eviden-
tiary proposition "I saw D kill H" is consistent only with the proposed
conclusion, "D killed H."
The inferential process here is so simple that the presence of the
inference is not apparent. This is because the evidentiary proposition
is such that it will support only one inference relative to the proposed
conclusion, and the influence takes substantially the same form as the
proposed conclusion. Thus, since the proposed conclusion is "D killed
H," and the evidence is the proposition presented in testimonial form
by a witness, "D killed H," it seems mere tautology to say that the
3. A trial, of course, usually involves several conclusions, as each issue in dispute
requires a proposed conclusion. Moreover, a proposition of evidence may put an
issue in dispute which is not in the pleadings, as in the case of impeachment of
witnesses. Thus, if witness X testifies that witness Y lied on the witness stand, this
evidence creates a proposed conclusion which is not in the pleading, i.e., that witness
Y lied. However, even though it is important always to determine to what conclusion
the evidence is directed, regardless of what conclusion this is, the analysis is the same.
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inference the trier is to make is "D killed H." Yet, the inference is
and must be present, because the inference is the conclusion which
the trier reaches on the basis of the evidence. It is because the infer-
ence coincides with the proposed conclusion that the trier will affirm
the proposed conclusion. Suppose, for example, the trier does not
believe the witness and does not accept the evidentiary proposition.
He will not draw a conclusion from the evidence, that is, he will not
make the necessary inference, and will not affrm the proposed conclu-
sion.
Every proposition also has a contradictory, which is the negative
form of an affirmative proposition. If the proposed conclusion is
"D killed H," the contradictory of the conclusion is "D did not kill H."
Consequently, it follows that if an evidentiary proposition is consistent
only with the proposed conclusion, it is inconsistent with the contra-
dictory of the proposed conclusion. The converse, of course, is also
true. If an evidentiary proposition is consistent only with the con-
tradictory of the proposed conclusion, it is inconsistent with the
proposed conclusion. Thus, if the proposed conclusion is "D killed
H," and the evidence is "D killed H," the evidence is direct evidence
because it is consistent only with the proposed conclusion. If the
evidence is "X killed H," it is direct evidence because it is consistent
only with the contradictory of the proposed conclusion. Direct evi-
dence then can be defined as a proposition which is consistent only
with either the proposed conclusion or its contradictory.
B. The Functional Meaning of Circumstantial Evidence
The functional meaning of circumstantial evidence is determined in
the same manner as the meaning of direct evidence, by ascertaining
the relationship of the evidentiary proposition to the proposed conclu-
sion. If the proposed conclusion is "D killed H." and the evidence is
the proposition, "D wrote H's wife a love letter," the evidence is con-
sistent with the conclusion that "D killed H." Indeed, to qualify as
evidence, which must be relevant to the proposed conclusion, it must
be consistent with the proposed conclusion in that it, just as direct
evidence, will support an inference which coincides with the proposed
conclusion. However, the above proposition of evidence is not in-
consistent, which is to say that it is consistent, with the contradictory
of the proposed conclusion. It will, in other words, support two
inferences: one which coincides with the proposed conclusion, and one
which coincides with the contradictory of the proposed conclusion.
This is the functional difference between direct and circumstantial evi-
dence. Direct evidence is a proposition which is consistent only with
either the proposed conclusion or its contradictory; circumstantial
1965 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
evidence is consistent with both the proposed conclusion and its
contradictory.
The difference between the two types of evidence can be seen in
the inferential process involved in the use of both. As shown above,
the inferential process in using direct evidence is a simple one, requir-
ing only a direct inference, which coincides with the proposed
conclusion. The inferential process in using circumstantial evidence
is much more complicated, requiring a series of inferences, and the
ultimate inference which coincides with the proposed conclusion is
an indirect one. To illustrate, assume again that the proposed con-
clusion is "D killed H," and that the evidence is the proposition "D
wrote H's wife a love letter." The problem in using this proposition
as evidence is to determine whether one can properly infer from this
proposition that D killed H, that is, can one properly draw from the
proposition an inference which coincides with the proposed conclusion.
To determine this, a series of inferences is necessary, which may be as
follows. From the fact of the writing of the love letter to W, one
can infer (1) that D loves W, that (2) D desired to possess W for
himself, that (3) D wished to get rid of H, that (4) D planned to get
rid of H, that (5) D executed his plan by killing H.
Each of these inferences is a particular inference, which, as opposed
to a general inference, is one in which the subject is a particular
person or thing. A general inference is one in which the subject is a
class of things. One of the distinctions between the two types of evi-
dence is that the use of circumstantial evidence always requires
the making of general inferences as well as particular inferences,
whereas, the use of direct evidence requires only the making of a
single particular inference from the evidence. This is because circum-
stantial evidence requires that one base his ultimate inferences on a
general inference in addition to the information stated in the proposi-
tion of evidence. Thus, one will not infer from the writing of the
love letter that D loved W unless he makes the general inference that
a man who writes a love letter to a woman probably does love her.
The particular inferences are drawn from the evidence; the general
inferences are drawn from one's knowledge, experience, and back-
ground, and it is the general inference that determines what particular
inference one is willing to draw from the evidence. The general infer-
ence can be called the evidentiary premise, and other general infer-
ences to support the above particular inferences are: (1) a man
who loves a woman probably desires her for himself alone; (2) a
man who loves a married woman probably wishes to get rid of
her husband; (3) a man who wishes to get rid of the husband of
the woman he loves probably plans to do so; and (4) a man who
[ VOL. 19
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plans to get rid of the husband of the woman he loves probably
killed him.
The same proposition of evidence, "D wrote H's wife a love letter,"
however, can be used to support an inference that D did not kill H.
The general inferences or evidentiary premises which are necessary for
the required particular inferences are that (1) a man who writes
a love letter to a woman probably does love her, are that (2) a
man who does love a woman probably does not want to hurt
her, that (3) a man who does not want to hurt a woman he loves
probably will not want to kill her husband, that (4) a man who does
not want to kill the husband of the woman he loves probably did not
plan to do so, that (5) a man who did not plan to kill another
probably did not do so. The series of particular inferences based
on the evidence and the general inferences may be articulated as
follows: that (1) D loves W, that (2) D does not want to hurt W,
that (3) D would not hurt W by killing H, that (4) D did not plan to
kill H, that (5) D did not kill H.
Neither of the two series of inferences is exhaustive, and neither
can be said to be right or wrong. It is true that a man who loves a
woman probably wants her for himself alone. It is equally true that
a man who loves a woman probably does not want to hurt her. The
line of inference any one person will develop depends to a large
extent on his personal background and experience, because these are
the ultimate sources upon which the particular inferences depend. A
person of deep religious faith, for example, is much less likely to infer
from the evidence that D killed H than a pagan would be. The proba-
tive force of circumstantial evidence thus varies, and it varies accord-
ing to whether the proposition of evidence supports a particular
inference which most persons would draw from the evidence. This
is the practical distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.
The probative value of direct evidence never varies regardless of what
the evidence is, although its credibility value does vary. The probative
value of circumstantial evidence always varies according to the content
of the proposition of evidence. And just as with direct evidence, its
credibility value varies. Thus, when we say that circumstantial evi-
dence will support two inconsistent inferences, it may be that neither of
the inferences is very strong, or it may be that one of the inferences is
very strong and the other very weak. But the fact that the circum-
stantial evidence may be very strong for one side or the other does
not alter the fact that it is still circumstantial evidence, although it
may mean that any contradictory inference would be so weak that the
evidence is useful for only one side. If, for example, the proposed
conclusion is that "D strangled H," and the evidence is the proposi-
1965 ]
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tion "D's thumbprint was found on H's neck," most persons will
probably infer that D strangled H. This is a strong inference because
on the basis of background and general experience, most persons
would make the general inference that a man whose thumbprint was
found on another's neck probably had his hand on that neck; that a
man who placed his hand on another's neck probably intended to
strangle the other; and that a man who intended to strangle another
man probably did so. However, the evidence is still circumstantial
evidence, because it is possible to infer, for example, that the thumb-
print was placed there after the strangling took place by D who was
attempting to aid H,4 even though this inference is weak.
Circumstantial evidence, then, can be defined as a proposition which
is consistent with both the proposed conclusion and its contradictory.
The test for determining whether the evidence is direct or circum-
stantial is whether only one inference can be drawn from the evidence
which coincides with either the proposed conclusion or its contradic-
tory. If there is only one such inference, the evidence is direct evi-
dence. If not, the evidence is circumstantial.5
IV. Tih TRADIIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF EVIDENCE
The above analysis has been made without reference to the tradi-
tional classification of evidence, direct, circumstantial, and real, and
the meanings given for direct and circumstantial evidence are not the
traditional meanings. In addition, there is another type of evidence
to which little attention has been directed in writings on evidence,
i.e., demeanor evidence. Since the premise of the above analysis is
that evidence is a proposition, and that there are only two basic types
of evidence, direct and circumstantial as defined, it is necessary to
'explain briefly the absence of real evidence and demeanor evidence
in the scheme.
A. Real Evidence and Demeanor Evidence
Real evidence is by definition a physical object capable of being
4. See, e.g., Beasley v. State, 404 P.2d 911 (Nev. 1965), in which the court held that
it was prejudicial error to permit a fingerprint expert to express an opinion as to the
time the defendant's finger and palm prints were placed on victim's automobile, where
the expert had not conducted a control test.
5. Cf. The following definition from Bentham: "In the case of testimonial evidence,
the subject of the testimony is either the very fact, the existence or non-existence of
which is the principal matter of fact in question, or some fact which, though distinct
from it, is considered as being evidentiary of it. Source of the decision in this case,-
identity or diversity of the matter of fact, asserted by the deponent in the instances
in question, with the principal fact in question in the cause. Species which are the
result of the division made in this direction and from this source,-direct evidence,




directly perceived by the senses, and it is thus a fact presented to the
senses of the trier. As such, it has been called percipient evidence.
However, in a trial, the trier of fact cannot alone determine the
proposition he may properly form, as a result of his perception, rela-
tive to the proposed conclusion. Thus, when any physical object is
introduced into evidence, it must be accompanied by a proposition,
and it is this proposition which is the evidence.
The above points can be illustrated by a recent case, United States
v. Klaw,6 an appeal from judgments of conviction for mailing and
conspiring to mail obscene matter. In this case, it was necessary for the
government to prove that the matter in question appealed to the
prurient interest of the average man. For this purpose, the govern-
ment introduced into evidence the material itself. The court reversed
the convictions for lack of evidence.
[T]he only predicate for any conclusion about prurient appeal was the
material itself, as if res ipsa loquitur. The jurors were, therefore, left to
speculate. They were invited to behold the accused material and, in effect,
conclude simply that it is undesirable, it is distasteful, it is disgusting ....
Because the jury was given no basis for understanding exactly how and why
the material appeals to its audience, whether deviate or average person,
it may too readily supply an explanation.--prurient appeal.'
7
The court went on to say, "Whatever the value of mere 'autoptical'
evidence in other contexts, it should not readily be countenanced in
this area," and concluded that the jury "had absolutely no evidentiary
basis from which to 'recognize' any appeal to the prurient interest
of the deviate or the typical recipient .... 8 In short, the real evi-
dence, the matter itself, was not accompanied by a proposition which
could be used as a basis for an inference to confirm or deny the
proposed conclusion.9
Demeanor evidence is simply the demeanor of the witness, and as
such cannot be offered into evidence. Just as real evidence is a
physical fact, demeanor evidence is a physical event, the conduct of
the witness in testifying. Both are directly perceived by the trier,
and both are accompanied by probative propositions presented by
6. 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
7. Id. at 167.
8. Ibid.
9. The court pointed out that, "[I]f proof of prurient stimulation and response is
generally important, it is particularly necessary when the prurient interest may be that of
a deviant segment of society whose reactions are hardly a matter of common knowledge.
It may well be that there are characters and cults to which exaggerated high heels,
black patent leather bindings and bondage have some occult significance, but- we
doubt that any court would take judicial notice of the reaction that deviates-or the
average man-might have to such stimuli. However, some proof should be offered
to demonstrate such appeal, thereby supplying the factfinders with knowledge of what




the witness in the form of testimony. The proposition which accom-
panies real evidence as a matter of admissibility must be relative
to the physical object which is presented to the senses of the trier.
The propositions which accompany demeanor evidence are the testi-
mony of the witness, which, insofar as their admissibility are con-
cerned, are independent of the demeanor of the witness. The value of
both real and demeanor evidence, however, is the same in that both
are merely persuasive. Thus, as a result of real evidence, the trier may
infer either that the accompanying probative proposition is true or
that it is not true. And as a result of the demeanor of the witness, the
trier will infer either (1) the witness is telling the truth, that is, the
probative propositions he presents are true, or (2) that the witness is
not telling the truth. If the witness, for example, casts furtive glances
while testifying, the trier will probably infer that he is not telling the
truth.
The physical objects and events-termed real and demeanor evi-
dence-are very important in a trial, but only because of their per-
suasive effect. The concepts are not helpful for purposes of analysis
once the role of real and demeanor evidence is understood in the light
of the two basic steps of proving. The process of proving is
essentially the process of drawing inferences from a proposition
which is evidence to relate the evidentiary proposition to the pro-
posed conclusion. Before one can reasonably use a proposition as
the basis of an inference, however, he must be convinced that the
proposition is reliable. The two basic steps in proving, then, are one,
determining the reliability of the evidence, and two, drawing the
inferences therefrom. The first step can be called the credibility
step; the second can be called the probative step, because it convinces
the mind of the truth or falsity of the proposed conclusion. These two
steps mean that each proposition of evidence requires two inferences,
the credibility inference and the probative inference. The credibility
inference is an inference about the evidence; the probative inference
is an inference from the evidence.
Real evidence and demeanor evidence are important only in regard
to the first step of proving-the determination of the reliability of
the evidence. Since real evidence is always accompanied by a prop-
osition, the only function that it serves is to help persuade the trier
of the correctness of the proposition." Thus, if the evidence is the
10. Cf. "Bringing a knife into Court is in strictness not giving evidence of the knife's
existence. It is a mode of enabling the Court to reach a conviction of the existence of
the knife, and is in that sense a means of producing persuasion; yet it is not giving
evidence in the sense that it is asking the Court to perform a process of inference,
and it therefore gives rise to no question of relevancy. There is direct apprehension
and conviction as to the truth or falsity of the desired proposition." 1 WGMonE,
EVIDENCE § 24 (3d ed. 1940). e
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proposition, "D owned the pistol which killed H," showing the pistol to
the trier will tend to persuade the trier that the proposition is true.
The same is true of demeanor evidence, because the only conclusion
the trier can come to on the basis of demeanor evidence is either
that the witness is telling the truth or the witness is not telling the
truth. This determination is one that must always be made, whether
or not real evidence is presented, and demeanor evidence is always
present, so it cannot be avoided. The fact that real evidence is
presented to the trier to help persuade him of the correctness of the
evidentiary proposition does not mean that it should be treated as evi-
dence of the proposed conclusion. Real and demeanor evidence, in
other words, are merely exhibits, the difference between them being
that the object called real evidence is voluntarily presented to the
trier, and the demeanor of the testifying witness is involuntarily pre-
sented. Once this is understood, the concepts of real and demeanor
evidence have no further use in analyzing evidentiary problems.
This does not mean, of course, that in its broadest scope, the term
evidence may not properly include real and demeanor evidence. It
does mean that when the term evidence is used to include them a
distinction must be made as to whether one is speaking of facts or
of information about facts. For purposes of analysis this can only
lead to confusion. Since the facts which are called real and demeanor
evidence must always be accompanied by propositions, confusion is
avoided by thinking of evidence as consisting only of propositions.
That a fact is presented along with a proposition of fact does not
make that fact evidence any more than any other fact which is the
basis of evidence, but which is not presented to the senses of the trier.
B. The Traditional Meaning of Direct Evidence
The above analysis of direct evidence is based on the relationship
of the evidence to the proposed conclusion. In traditional terms,
'direct evidence' is used to mean the testimony of witnesses." The
term direct in this sense refers not to the relationship of the evidence
to the proposed conclusion, but to the relationship of the witness to
the fact which is the basis of his testimony.12 In other words, a
witness is supposed to testify only to matters of which he has direct
knowledge,' 3 and thus testimony is direct evidence.
The idea that a witness can testify only to matters of his direct
11. Id., § 25.
12. Cf. The following definition taken from a requested instruction to the jury held
by the court to define direct evidence correctly. "Direct evidence is where a witness
testifies directly of his own knowledge of the main facts or facts to be proved."' State
v. Regazzi, 379 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo. 1964).
13. "The Attestation of the witness must be what he knows, and not to that only
which he hath heard, for a mere Hearsay is no Evidence; for it is his knowledge that
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knowledge is probably the single most important idea in the common
law system of evidence. It is manifested in what may be called the
direct evidence concept, which is implemented by the three major
exclusionary rules, the hearsay, the opinion, and the best evidence
rules. Thus, a witness, generally, may not testify as to what others
said, he cannot give his opinion, and the original of a document must
be produced, or its absence satisfactorily explained, and it is this
concept on which the idea of testimony as being direct evidence
seems to be based.
When, however, the traditional meaning of direct evidence is
analyzed in terms of inferences related to the proposed conclusion,
it is not so far removed from the functional definition as it may first
seem. The functional definition is based on an analysis of the
relationship of the evidence to the proposed conclusion. The tradi-
tional definition is based on the relationship between the evidence
and the witness who presents it. Functionally, evidence is direct
because only a direct inference is necessary to relate it to the proposed
conclusion. From this, it follows that any proposition of evidence
is direct evidence of the matter contained therein, when the matter
contained therein is treated as the proposed conclusion. In other
words, any proposition is direct evidence of the fact asserted,
because any proposition will support a direct inference as to the fact
asserted. Thus, the evidentiary proposition, "D owned the pistol which
killed H," is direct evidence that D owned the postol which killed H.
The meaning of evidence as direct in the functional sense then
differs from the traditional meaning, when the latter is analyzed, only
in terms of the conclusion to which each is related. Each proposition
of evidence can be viewed as a conclusion to be proved, or each
proposition of evidence can be viewed as simply a basis for confirm-
ing or denying a proposed conclusion. The traditional view is that
each proposition of evidence is a conclusion, and thus each proposition
of evidence is direct evidence, because it will support a direct infer-
ence as to the matter contained therein. On this basis all testimony
can be classified as direct evidence, even in the functional sense.
The traditional meaning of direct evidence, however, is not usually
so analyzed, and the classification of testimony as direct evidence is
must direct the Court and Jury in the Judgment of the Fact, and not his mere
Credulity, which is very uncertain and various in several Persons; for Testimony
being but an Appeal to the knowledge of another, if indeed he doth not know, he
can be no Evidence ....
"But though Hearsay be not allowed as direct Evidence, yet it may be in Corrobora-
tion of a Witness's Testimony to show that he affirmed the same Thing before on
other Occasions, and that the Witness is still consistent with himself; for such Evi-
dence is only in support of the witness that gives in his Testimony upon Oath."
GCmB.Er, TRE LAW OF EvmrEscE 152-53 (1769). (Emphasis added.)
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a result of the concern of the common law for the reliability of the
evidence.14 Thus, only if a witness speaks from his direct knowledge,
can the evidence be deemed to be reliable. This emphasis on reliabil-
ity in turn gives rise to what can be called the step analysis of
proving, that is, the idea that evidence consists of a series of related
items; each of which is a conclusion, and each of which must be
proved before the subsequent can be used. Each proposition so
viewed is the basis of direct inferences. Thus, if each item of evidence
is true, and serves only as the basis of a direct inference, the correct
conclusion must inevitably follow. This point is discussed in greater
detail later. For the present, however, it is sufficient to say that the
step analysis of proving for a trial is analytically unsound.
The greatest difficulty with the traditional meaning of direct evi-
dence is that it does not provide the most useful basis for under-
standing the function of evidence, as it does not provide a sound
basis for distinguishing direct and circumstantial evidence.
C. The Traditional Meaning of Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence, in the traditional meaning of the term, is
simply evidence of circumstances. 15 The primary question in regard to
circumstantial evidence is whether it is relevant, and thus circum-
stantial evidence must always be related to the proposed conclusiori.
When this requirement is understood in terms of how relevance is
determined, the result is the functional definition stated above.
Relevancy is a concept of relationship, and the relevancy of proposi-
tions can exist in various ways, for example, in terms of subject or
predicate, and for different purposes. For propositions of evidence,
relevancy exists in terms of inference. Evidence must be relevant to
the proposed conclusion, and it is relevant only if it can support an
inference which coincides with the proposed conclusion or the con-
tradictory of the proposed conclusion. If a proposition of evidence
is such that it can support inferences which coincide with both the
proposed conclusion and its contradictory, it is consistent with either.
This is always true of evidence of circumstances, and thus circum-
stantial evidence is a proposition consistent with either the proposed
conclusion or its contradictory.
14. "The first therefore and most signal Rule, in Relation to Evidence, is this, That a
Man must have the utmost Evidence, the Nature of the fact is capable of: For the
Design of the Law is to come to rigid Demonstration in Matters of Right, and there
can be no Demonstration of a Fact without the best of Evidence that the Nature of
the Thing is capable of; less Evidence doth create but Opinion and Surmise, and
does not leave a Man the entire Satisfaction, that arises from Demonstration.
Id. at 4-5.
15. "Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances in a certain
case, from which the jury may infer other and connected facts, which usually and
reasonably follow, according to the common experience of mankind." Ibid.
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The functional meanings of direct and circumstantial evidence sug-
gested above, then, are not radically different from the traditional
meanings of the terms. They result primarily from a more refined
analysis of the concepts than is usually accorded them, and the
basic idea of this analysis is an extremely simple one. It is that in
classifying the types of evidence, a uniform basis for analysis should
be used. Thus, instead of classifying direct evidence on the basis of
the relationship of the witness who gives the evidence to the fact
which is the basis of the evidence, and circumstantial evidence on
the basis of the relationship of the evidence to the proposed con-
clusion, all evidence should be classified on the same basis. This basis
is the relationship of the evidence to the proposed conclusion.
V. THE RuLtEs OF EVIDENCE AND THE TYPES OF EVIDENCE
The above analysis of evidence as propositions of fact and of the
types of evidence as direct and circumstantial is helpful primarily in
providing a different perspective from which to examine the rules of
evidence and the problems of proving in a trial.
A rule of evidence is a statement about the use of evidence in a
trial. Disregarding, for the moment, the types of evidence, the rules
can be classified into three general groups: (1) Those concerned
with the fairness of a trial; (2) those based on ascertaining the truth;
and (3) those based on policies extrinsic to the trial. The first group
may be called procedural, and includes rules as to oath, examination,
cross-examination, and burdens of proof; the second group may be
called probative, and includes the exclusionary rules, their exceptions,
and rules of circumstantial evidence; the third group may be called
extrinsic policy rules, and includes rules as to privilege and those
rules having their basis in constitutional provisions. Some rules, such
as those of examination and cross-examination of witnesses, of course,
serve more than one purpose. The classification, however, does serve
to limit and define the rules here under consideration, the probative
rules, that is, those rules concerned with propositions of evidence
used as the basis of probative inferences.
A. Reliability Rules and Inferential Rules
The probative rules constitute a heterogenous group and do not
easily lend themselves to grouping or classification. They include,
for example, the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the best evidence
rule, the exceptions to the hearsay rule, and circumstantial evidence
rules as to habit and custom, character evidence, and so on. One
basis for classification is direct and circumstantial evidence, but under
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the traditional meanings of these terms, the classification tends to be
confusing because circumstantial evidence is also direct evidence,
that is, it is the testimony of witnesses based on their knowledge.
However, if the rules are analyzed in terms of evidence as propositions
and in terms of the two basic steps of proving, the determining of
the reliability of the evidence and the drawing of inferences therefrom,
they fall rather easily into two groups, general and particular. The
general rules are primarily concerned with reliability of the evidence
and may be called the reliability rules. The particular rules are
primarily concerned with inferences to be drawn from the evidence,
and may be called the inferential rules.
The reliability rules are those applicable without regard to probative
value of the evidence, because they are directed primarily to form
and source. The major reliability rules are the hearsay, the opinion,
and the best evidence rules. Regardless of the probative value of a
proposition of hearsay evidence, it may be excluded under the hearsay
rule; a witness is to state propositions of fact, not opinion, and only the
original of a document may be used. All of these rules are directed
to the reliability of the evidence.
The inferential rules include the exceptions to these rules, especially
the hearsay rule, and the circumstantial evidence rules. These rules
are inferential because they are concerned with the inferences which
may be drawn from particular items of evidence, and a determination
of their applicability is made on the basis of the inference which can
be drawn from the evidence. Although the exceptions to the hearsay
rule are all purportedly predicated on some special basis of reliability,
the exceptions permit the trier to make the inference desired by
the proponent. In effect, the rules say that this proposition of evidence
is reliable as probative evidence as a matter of law, but this determina-
tion is not made without full cognizance of the desired inference.
In the case of a dying declaration, for example, a witness is permitted
to testify to the deceased's identification of the defendant as his
killer. From this proposition of evidence, the trier is warranted in
making the inference that defendant was the killer, notwithstanding
evidence to the contrary. A clearer example is admissions, where
even though the party opponent had no basis for his statement other
than what he has heard, the trier is justified in using the information
as a basis of proof.16
Since the exceptions to the hearsay rule are usually analyzed in
terms of the reliability of the evidence rather than the inferences
which may be drawn therefrom, the above point can be better illus-
trated with rules of circumstantial evidence. Most of the circumstan-
16. E.g., Jamus v. Atskin, 91 N.H. 373, 20 A.2d 552 (1941).
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tial evidence rules exclude evidence because the inference to be drawn
from the evidence is so obvious that the trier may give undue weight
to its probative value. Thus, evidence of other crimes in a criminal
case is excluded because the jury might too readily infer from the
evidence the commission of the crime in question. Most of the circum-
stantial evidence rules, however, have a double aspect. Evidence of
other crimes, for example, may be used to show motive, intent, plan
or design. Although evidence of subsequent repairs cannot be used to
show negligence, it can be used to show possession or control of the
instrument which caused the injury. As a result of this double aspect
of the circumstantial evidence rules, the rules in effect determine the
inference the trier is allowed to draw. It is this point which most
clearly indicates the reason for designating these rules inferential rules.
B. Two Basic Premises Underlying the Rules of Evidence
The rules thus present a broad pattern of general rules directed
to the reliability of the evidence and particular rules directed to
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. There are broad
rules of an encompassing nature within which the narrower rules
operate. The pattern appears to be a sound one. Yet, within the pat-
tern there are inconsistencies and contradictions. Ultimately, one
may suppose, the major reason for this is that the rules were de-
veloped in piecemeal fashion with two objectives in mind. One is
that all evidence in a trial must be reliable; the other is that the
trier should be allowed to draw only direct inferences from the
evidence. It may be that these objectives were primarily the result
of either the jury system or of the adversary system. More probably
they were the result of both. Thus, it would be unfair to an opponent
to compel him to run the risk that the jury might reach its decision
on the basis of unreliable evidence. In any event, these objectives can
be stated as constituting the two basic premises underlying the rules
of evidence: (1) All evidence admitted in the trial of a case must be
true; and (2) the trier shall be allowed to draw only direct inferences
therefrom.
To say that the rules of evidence are based, on the premise that
all evidence admissible in the trial must be true is not to say that all
evidence admissible is true or that anyone believes that it is all true.
It is to say only that the rules are designed to insure insofar as
possible that only true or reliable evidence shall be used. Similarly,
the trier cannot in fact be limited to making only direct inferences
from the evidence, but the purpose of this objective is to prevent the
trier, insofar as possible, from making an inference on an inference.
Direct inference in this sense means an inference which takes the
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same form, or substantially the same form, as the proposition of evi-
dence which is its basis. It is a conclusion inferred directly from the
proposition, without the necessity of using a general inference to
make the conclusion. The evidentiary proposition, "D wrote H's wife
a love letter," will support a direct inference as to this fact; but it will
support only an indirect inference that D loved H, because to make
this inference, one must use the general inference that a man who
writes a love letter to a woman loves that woman.
The above two premises, of course, are wholly inconsistent with
matters as they exist. As to the first, since a trial is an adversary
proceeding, the evidence introduced in a trial must inevitably be
in conflict, and part of it therefore untrue. If it is not in conflict, the
jury will not get the case, which the judge will dispose of by a
directed verdict or similar procedural device. As to the second
premise, again the jury will not get the case if but one reasonable
inference can be drawn as to the ultimate conclusion from all the
evidence. Only if two reasonable inferences can be drawn is there
any reason to submit the case to the jury. Moreover, circumstantial
evidence by its nature requires indirect inferences. The inevitable
question, then, is how can it be said that these two premises
underlie the probative rules of evidence.
The explanation is twofold. First of all, it appears likely that the
premises are primarily a result of the traditional meanings of direct
evidence, with no consideration of circumstantial evidence. 17 The tradi-
tional meaning of direct evidence, as evidence of which a witness has
direct knowledge, encompasses circumstantial evidence. More impor-
tant, however, the premises relate to evidence as separate items of
evidence and not to a consideration of the evidence in a given trial
as a whole. Thus, it is each item of evidence that must be true and
it is from each item of evidence that only a direct inference can be
drawn.
C. The Step Analysis of Proving Criticized
The above two premises have either resulted in, or resulted from,
what may be called the step analysis of proving in a trial. This is
the idea that where evidence consists of items A, B, C, D, and E sup-
porting conclusion F, each of these items must be determined to be
true before the succeeding one can be used in confirming or denying
17. Circumstantial evidence does not seem to have been recognized as a separate
type of evidence in the early common law. Thus, Gilbert in the first treatise on
common law evidence, says: "when the Fact itself cannot be proved, that which comes
nearest to the Proof of the Fact is, the Proof of Circumstances that necessarily and
usually attend such Facts, and these are called Presumptions and not Proof, for they
stand instead of the Proofs of the Fact till the contrary be proved." GmBERT, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 160.
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the proposed conclusion. Each item of evidence, in other words, is
treated as a conclusion to be proved before succeeding items can be
used. As Wigmore said, "In the usual discussion of Circumstantial
evidence, difficulty has constantly arisen from not keeping in mind
that most Circumstantial evidentiary data must ultimately in turn
become themselves a Probandum and be proved by Testimonial evi-
dence .... "I Since this means that proof must occur before the
trier has the opportunity to consider all the evidence, it means that
the evidence is treated as proof. However, confusion in analysis
results if the evidentiary proposition is treated as proof, rather than
merely as the basis of proof. Proof is not accomplished until the aim
of the process of proving, conviction in the mind, is achieved, and
this conviction is determined by the inference one draws from the
evidence. If proof is that which produces conviction in the mind,
proof is not the evidence, but the inference the trier draws from the
evidence.
The point that it is the inference which constitutes proof is illus-
trated by Conley v. Mervis.9 The proposed conclusion for which the
evidence was offered was that there was a master-servant relationship
between defendant and the driver of a truck involved in the collision
in question. The evidence was the proposition, "D owned the dealer's
license plates on the truck." This testimony had been given by de-
fendant when called by plaintiff as on cross-examination. At issue on
appeal was the permissible scope of cross-examination. Should de-
fendant's counsel have been allowed to cross-examine him on the
question of his ownership of the truck after plaintiff had called him
to the stand. In reversing the trial court for refusal to allow the
examination, the appellate court said:
Under our decisions with respect to dealer's license plates, this admission
had embodied in it not only the fact of ownership but inferences sufficient
to take the case to the jury: namely, that the motor vehicle was owned
by defendant; that the driver was his servant; and that the vehicle was
being driven at the time on his business. It was not the fact of ownership
which was harmful but the implications arising from it .... 2D
The trial court had held that as defendant's testimony had been
limited to the question of ownership of the license plates, defendant's
examination by his own counsel could not extend beyond that precise
matter.
This strict limitation entirely ignored the purpose for which defendant's
ownership of the license tags was introduced in evidence and its legal effect
18. 1 WIGMORE, THE SCmNeCE oF JUDICrAL PnooF 16 (3d ed. 1937).
19. 324 Pa. 577, 188 At. 350 (1936).
20. Id. at 583, 188 AtI. at 353.
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as proof of the existence of a master and servant relationship. This evidence
was produced exclusively for the purpose of giving rise to a presumption
of such relationship. The inferences flowing therefrom enabled plaintiffs
to make out a prima facie case, and their probative value was the impelling
and vital reason for securing from defendant an admission of ownership
of the license plates. The fact of ownership, standing alone and stripped
of these inferences, meant nothing to their case. The inferences are the
damaging part of this testimony.2'
The use of the step analysis of proving for analyzing the process of
proving in a trial appears to result from a failure to distinguish be-
tween proving generally and proving in a trial. Proving generally
may be analyzed in retrospect as a step process, but this is so only
after a long process of investigation, analysis, and evaluation of
evidence. In a laboratory, for example, the scientist is never con-
vinced of the correctness of a proposition until he is sure of the
correctness of his evidentiary propositions. Proving in a trial, however,
is a much more complicated process, and it is unique in that the trier
in the usual case is always faced with two lines of evidence, each more
or less equally plausible and each supporting the proposed conclusion
or its contradictory. This point has often been obscured because one
line of evidence is invariably rejected. Moreover, the step analysis of
proof appears to be appropriate if the evidence is direct evidence as
defined in functional terms, because only a single direct inference is
necessary to sustain the proposed conclusion. Thus, one item of
direct evidence may be sufficient to induce a trier to confirm the
proposed conclusion. If the witness testifies, "D killed H," and the
trier believes the witness, he will confirm the conclusion, "D killed H."
But, of course, there is only one step involved here.
D. A Suggested Analysis of the Process of Proving
The traditional meaning of direct evidence obscures the fact that
most evidence in a trial is circumstantial evidence, and it is in regard
to circumstantial evidence that the step analysis of proving is most
unsatisfactory. The evidence, "D wrote H's wife a love letter," is direct
evidence of the matter contained therein, but it is only circumstantial
evidence of the conclusion that D killed H. It is obvious, however,
that this evidence will not produce an inference creating such
a conviction in the mind as the burden of proof requires. Thus, other
evidence must be produced, and it is easy to assume that this other
evidence constitutes a series of steps, or links in a chain leading to
the proposed conclusion. Such other items may be (a) threats by
D against H's life; (b) the purchase of a pistol and ammunition by
21. Id. at 584, 188 Ad. at 354.
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D; (c) procurement by D of a key to the front door of H's house;
(d) D's presence in the neighborhood of the house shortly before and
after the killing; and (e) the finding of D's hat in the house immedi-
ately after the killing.
These other items, however, are not merely links in a chain of proof.
Each is the basis of a series of inferences which concludes with the
inference, "D killed H," coinciding with the proposed conclusion. This
is the crucial point. Each item of probative evidence must be relevant,
and to be relevant it must support an inference which coincides with
the proposed conclusion. The strength of the inferences, of course,
varies, and it is the combination of inferences, all of which coincide
with the proposed conclusion, from different items of evidence that
produces the conviction. The process cannot be properly analyzed as a
step process whereby one proceeds from one item of evidence to the
next, because it is not necessary that the trier accept all of the eviden-
tiary propositions in order to find that D killed X. He cannot, of
course, reject too many of them, but the point is that items of
circumstantial evidence are related to each other only because
each of them will support an inference which coincides with the
proposed conclusion. Items of evidence may or may not be otherwise
related to each other, but they must all be related to the proposed
conclusion. Thus, the evidence that D wrote H's wife a love letter
may be related to the evidence that D acquired a key to H's house.
The meaning of the relationship of these two items, however, depends
not upon how they are related to each other, but upon how they are
related to the proposed conclusion.
Analysis of proving in a trial as suggested above, that is, relating all
the items of evidence to the proposed conclusion rather than to each
other, provides a basis for a different approach to the rules of evidence.
The following tentative analysis is suggested. All of the rules of evi-
dence, not only the inferential rules, may be viewed as being directed
to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. For example, in
regard to hearsay, if the witness testifies, "X said 'D wrote H's wife a
love letter,"' the statement is hearsay, that is, it is offered to prove
the truth of the matter therein. The hearsay is the statement of the
extrajudicial declarant. The testimony thus is a proposition contain-
ing a proposition, and the danger is not that the proposition contain-
ing the hearsay is unreliable, but that the hearsay contained in the
proposition will be used as a basis of inference. The hearsay rule, in
effect, determines that the evidence is unreliable as a matter of law
and precludes the jury from using it as a basis of inference. The
difference between the reliability and inferential rules is that the
former approach the problem of inference from the standpoint of
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reliability of the evidence in terms of form and source, and the
latter approach the problem from the standpoint of inference.
The former approach is a natural one in terms of the two basic steps
of proving, determining the reliability of the evidence and the drawing
of inferences therefrom. Since, however, by far the greater emphasis
in the law of evidence is on the reliability of the evidence, the
question of whether or not the present unsatisfactory state of the law
of evidence can be attributed to this fact inevitably arises. It is
probable, for example, that it is the insistence on the reliability of
evidence that has resulted in so many exceptions to the hearsay rule,
because the strictness of the rule makes it operation without exceptions
impractical. The fact that some special basis of reliability can be
stated for each exception does not alter the fact that the evidence is
hearsay, and the anomaly is that the rules of law allowing hearsay
give admissible hearsay a special seal of approval.
This is not to say that the reliability of evidence in a trial is un-
important. It is to say that the attempt to insure reliability of evi-
dence primarily through the application of rules of evidence may
be unrealistic, and that the problem of what evidence to admit in a
trial should be approached from the standpoint of inferences. Thus, if
we start with the basic principle of the law of evidence that all
admissible evidence must be relevant and analyze this principle in
terms of inference, the following point is correct. Any proposition of
evidence to be relevant must support an inference, either directly or
indirectly, which coincides with a conclusion in issue. This point
serves immediately to limit the number of propositions which can be
admitted as evidence.
A more significant point, however, is that the evidence as to any
proposed conclusion, both pro and con, is going to be based, or
allegedly based, on the same fact or set of facts, although when the
evidence is directed to the contradictory of the proposed conclusion,
the set of facts is enlarged. The point that the evidence must be
directed to the same conclusions or its contradictory is the key factor
in enabling the trier to determine the reliability of the evidence. He
does this in two ways: (1) by drawing, tentative inferences to
determine the consistency of the evidence, that is, to determine if each
proposition will support an inference which coincides with the pro-
posed conclusion; and (2) by considering the source of the evidence.
Thus, if the evidence is hearsay, or comes from an interested witness
or is merely an opinion, these are factors that the trier will inevitably
take into consideration. Since all of the evidence supporting a
proposed conclusion must be consistent, it is this consistency or the
lack of it that is most significant in convincing the trier to accept or
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reject the evidence. Thus, the important point about the reliability
of evidence is not, as is generally thought, the reliability of individual
items of evidence, but the reliability of the evidence as a whole,
because it is the evidence viewed as a whole that will give the trier
the most appropriate basis for rejecting unreliable items of evidence.
Otherwise, much evidence must inevitably be left out, and "The
properties, which constitute trustworthiness in a mass of evidence,
are two: correctness and completeness."22
This approach requires a recognition of the fact that it is not evi-
dence which is proof, but the inference which the trier draws from
the evidence.23 Thus, proving is essentially a subjective process, be-
cause only the individual himself can make inferences. The value
of the suggested approach is that it provides a basis for articulating
precisely how the trier, using evidence, confirms or denies the
proposed conclusion. The trier must make credibility inferences as
to the reliability of the evidence, and then make probative inter-
ferences, either direct or indirect, which coincide with the proposed
conclusion. An explict recognition of these points decreases the
importance of the reliability of each individual item of evidence in a
trial because it requires that the evidence be viewed as a whole rather
than piecemeal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The result of the above analysis can be summarized as follows.
First, evidence consists of propositions which are not proof, but only
the possible basis of proof, if the trier determines them to be reliable.
As such, evidence is basically information. Second, the basic require-
ment for the admission of evidence is relevancy, and all relevant evi-
dence is admissible. Third, relevancy is determined by whether the
evidence will support an inference which coincides with the proposed
conclusion. Fourth, evidence which supports a direct interference to
coincide with the proposed conclusion (direct evidence), should
22. BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 5, at 28.
23. The position here taken that it is the inference and not the evidence which con-
stitutes proof may appear to be somewhat artificial, since there can be no probative
inference without propositions of evidence. Thus, there is justification for calling the
evidence proof, because it is the only tangible form proof takes. However, this
convenient usage of the term proof obscures the point that proving is fundamentally a
subjective process in that proving is a matter of proving to oneself. It is true that
the term to prove is most often used in an objective sense to mean the presentation of
evidence, and so used it is proper. This aspect of proving is merely a preliminary
process, essential to accomplish the aim of proof, conviction in the mind as to the
truth of falsity of a proposed conclusion. When used in this sense, proving is com-
pleted upon the presentation of evidence. This view of proving thus does not provide
any basis for understanding why one litigant succeeds in his proof and the other
fails, except that the trier believed the evidence of one and not the other.
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require some special indicia of reliability, because only one item of
direct evidence may be needed to support a conclusion. Fifth, evi-
dence which supports an indirect inference to coincide with the
proposed conclusion (circumstantial evidence) should be admissible
in the absence of indicia of unreliability, since one item of circum-
stantial evidence is never sufficient to support a conclusion.'

